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1. Introduction 
In many social interactions, the availability of approval and disapproval seems to affect 
behavior.
1
 On one hand, social approval for generosity and courage may provide an incentive for 
charitable donations (Vesterlund, 2006) and military service (Frey, 2007). On the other hand, 
disapproval from work colleagues may prevent highly productive employees from exceeding the 
formally agreed rate of output (Homans, 1961), or preclude workers from underbidding the 
prevailing wage in a community (Akerlof, 1980). In a more anecdotic example, people 
sometimes take queue-jumpers to task, which probably attenuates such opportunistic behavior. 
Finally, some controlled lab evidence shows that approval and disapproval can foster pro-social 
behaviors (Masclet et al, 2003; Rege and Telle, 2004; Noussair and Tucker, 2005; Xiao and 
Houser, 2005; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; Xiao and Houser, 2009; Dugar, 2010).
2
 
In this paper we report data from two experimental treatments which complement the 
previous literature. The research goal of our first treatment is to investigate the determinants of 
approval and disapproval. In this manner we can understand better what situations are more 
likely to trigger negative or positive reactions, an important issue if we want to explain behaviors 
like the ones cited above or, in general, if we believe that such reactions are deterrents of norm 
deviance or amplifiers of socially desirable behaviors like cooperation.  
Participants in this treatment play four simple games with a two-stage structure. In the 
first stage, the first mover A chooses between two allocations of monetary payoffs for her and 
the second mover B. In the second stage, the second mover can then assign negative/positive 
points to A conditional on A’s choice; these points do not affect A’s payoff but it is common 
knowledge that they respectively signal disapproval/approval by B. The four games differ 
systematically in the available allocations, which renders it possible to explore several potential 
determinants of disapproval and approval. In particular, whether the second mover 
disapproves/approves because the first mover (i) chose the allocation in the game with the 
minimum/maximum payoff for B –i.e., A harmed/helped B (see Holländer, 1990 for a model in 
                                                 
1
 Disapproval can take many forms: humiliation, insults, shaming or social ostracism, while honors and praise are 
examples of social approval.  
2
 The reason why approval and disapproval influence behavior is not yet fully clarified. It might be that they affect a 
player’s utility because (some) people are averse to being disapproved, and like to be approved. This is explored in 
López-Pérez and Vorsatz (2010). We note that approval and disapproval are sometimes respectively called non-
monetary reward and punishment in the experimental literature.  
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this line), (ii) deviated from/chose a strictly egalitarian allocation, or (iii) chose an allocation 
where she gets a larger/lower payoff than B. 
Our second treatment is identical to the first one, except that the negative/positive points 
here reduce/increase A’s payoff and are not explicitly described as disapproval/approval. By 
comparing the results from both treatments, we aim to compare the determinants of 
approval/disapproval with those of monetary punishment/reward, which directly affects the 
pecuniary payoff of the punished/rewarded agent. Are these determinants similar? This research 
question is motivated by two issues. On one hand, a large experimental literature shows that the 
availability of monetary punishment and rewards can promote cooperation, generosity, and 
fairness (Güth et al. 1982; Ostrom et al., 1992; Andreoni et al, 1993; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 
Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Gürerk et al, 2006; Walker and Halloran, 2004; Sefton et al, 
2007, Vyrastekova and van Soest; 2008; Ertan et al, 2009). On the other hand, we suspect that 
these laboratory findings may be difficult to extrapolate to the field, where the use of monetary 
sanctions goes often against the law or prevailing social norms. For instance, destroying some of 
another person’s wealth, which is an extreme example of a monetary sanction, is condemned by 
many people. In contrast, the use of disapproval is arguably less regulated, and we conjecture 
that most non-institutionalized sanctions outside the lab take the form of disapproval. If there are 
substantial differences in the determinants of monetary and non-monetary punishment, therefore, 
we need to be particularly careful when extrapolating lab findings on monetary sanctions. 
Overall, our findings suggest some key differences in motivation for punishing/rewarding 
and disapproving/approving. On one hand, we find that factors (i) and (ii) above play the key 
role for disapproval and approval: People disapprove choices that harm them or deviate from a 
strictly egalitarian allocation, and approve those that help them or achieve strict equality. On the 
other hand, we observe that monetary punishment and reward are most affected by factor (iii) 
and to some extent (i): Punishment/reward increases if player A gets a larger/lower payoff than 
player B (for related evidence see Zizzo, 2003; Falk et al., 2005; Dawes et al., 2007) and if 
player A harmed/helped B. Thus, our study provides evidence that payoff comparisons are 
relatively more important to explain monetary punishment and reward suggesting that the 
punishment/reward technology determines which behaviors are punished and rewarded. 
Our paper is related to previous studies comparing monetary and non-monetary 
punishment and reward. Masclet et al (2003), for example, find in the context of a repeated 
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public goods experiment that non-monetary punishment can be similarly effective as monetary 
one to raise contributions and earnings. In a similar context, Noussair and Tucker (2005) show 
that contributions and overall welfare are higher when both types of punishment are available 
than when only one of the two types is available. Xiao and Houser (2005) study the role of 
emotion expression in ultimatum games and observe fewer rejections of unfair offers if 
recipients can send a message to the proposer –see also Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) and 
Xiao and Houser (2009), who study emotion expression in a dictator game. In general, the focus 
of much if this literature is whether the availability of monetary and non-monetary 
punishment/reward increases cooperation, fairness, or social efficiency, whereas our focus is on 
motivations, comparing those behind monetary and non-monetary punishment/reward. For this 
reason, we consider one-shot games which allow us to disentangle between inequity aversion and 
reciprocity concerns and rule out reputation or temporal effects.
3
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our experimental 
design and procedures. Section 3 presents and discusses our results. Section 4 concludes with 
some ideas for further research. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
 Our experimental design consists of a Monetary (M) and a Non-Monetary (NM) 
treatment, and each subject participated only in one of them. We describe first the NM-treatment. 
Participants play four games, all of them two-player games of perfect information with a similar 
two-stage structure. In the first stage, a player (called A) chooses between two allocations of 
money between herself and another player (called B). Table 1 shows the two (A, B) payoff 
allocations available in each game (called left and right). Payoffs are presented in points, at the 
exchange rate 10 points = 1 Euro; we discuss below the payoffs chosen. 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 This is a point to keep in mind when comparing our results with those from other papers like Masclet et al (2003) 
that use repeated games. In particular, the effect of non-monetary punishment/rewards on the first movers’ behavior 
in our games (not the focus of our study, though) might have been attenuated by the lack of reputation effects.  
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TABLE 1―THE (A, B) ALLOCATIONS IN THE 4 GAMES 
  Game 
  1 2 3 4 
Allocation 
Left (250, 100) (250, 100) (100, 200) (100, 200) 
Right (200, 150) (250, 250) (150, 150) (100, 300) 
 
In the second stage of each game and conditional on A`s choice, B can pay a fixed cost of 
five points from her allocation share to reward or punish A in a non-monetary manner. If B pays 
the five points, more precisely, she can send an “evaluation score” s [-100, 100] to A 
expressing either approval or disapproval of her choice. In this respect, the instructions explicitly 
used the words “approval” for positive scores and “disapproval” for negative scores. Hence, an 
evaluation score of s = +100 means maximal approval, and s = -100 means maximal disapproval. 
The interpretation of score s is common knowledge. If B does not want to send an evaluation 
score to A, no points are deducted from B’s allocation share. As an illustration of the payoff 
structure, suppose that A chooses allocation (xA, xB) in a game. Since B cannot affect A’s 
balance in this treatment, A is then sure to get a payoff of xA. With respect to B, she would get a 
payoff of xB - 5 if she sends an evaluation score, and a payoff of xB otherwise. 
The M-treatment is identical to the NM-treatment, except for two important differences. 
First, B can affect the monetary payoff of the co-player –i.e., she can reward or punish A in a 
monetary manner. More precisely, B can either increase or decrease A’s payoff by up to 100 
points if she previously pays five points from her allocation share. If B does not want to affect 
A’s balance, no points are deducted from her allocation share. Second, the instructions never 
used the terms “approval” or “disapproval”. To clarify further the payoff structure, suppose that 
A chooses allocation (xA, xB) in a game. If B decides not to pay the five points, allocation (xA, xB) 
is implemented. If she pays the five points fee, however, she can choose a “point score” s [-
100, 100] so that A’s payoff in the game is xA + s, while B gets a payoff of xB - 5. For simplicity, 
s had to be a multiple of 10. 
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 Note that subjects must pay a (small) fixed fee to punish/reward in both treatments. When 
choosing this technology of punishment/reward, we had in mind our research goals and this 
related question: What design facilitates most the interpretation of the determinants of 
punishment/reward, making possible as well a clean comparison across treatments?  To think 
more about this issue, consider the following alternative technologies: (i) costless 
punishment/reward and (ii) costly punishment/reward where costs directly depend on the 
assigned point score s. In contrast to (i), our technology with a costly fee prevents random 
choices from selfish players, which could theoretically occur if punishing/rewarding was costless 
and would complicate the interpretation of our results.
4
 Furthermore, we chose a fixed fee to 
facilitate comparisons of the strength of sanctions and rewards across treatments. If players have 
to pay a non-negligible cost for each point assigned to the co-player, in contrast, there are 
reasons to believe that the strength of approval and disapproval could be distorted.
5
 
We conducted seven sessions at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. 92 subjects 
participated in the M-treatment and 84 in the NM-treatment. Participants were students from 
different disciplines (9.6 percent came from the faculty of economics) and not students of the 
experimenters. The experimental procedures were identical in both treatments. Before the start of 
each session, we distributed instruction and decision sheets (dependent on role) in a class room, 
leaving enough space between seats to ensure anonymity.
6
 Then the subjects entered in the room. 
The sheets were initially covered and the subjects could freely choose their seat; in that manner, 
we assigned them to be either an A- or a B-player. Subjects could read the instructions at their 
own pace and questions were answered in private. We avoided terms such as “punishment” or 
                                                 
4
 One potential problem of the fee is that we lose evidence from those subjects who are very sensitive to the cost of 
punishing/rewarding. Since the fee is very small, however, we believe that this potential problem is not significant. 
5
 To clarify this, suppose that each point assigned is costly and A chooses an allocation where she gets a higher 
payoff than B. Since approval and disapproval do not affect A’s payoff, the assignment of points by B would 
decrease B’s payoff and hence increase A’s payoff advantage. This might affect the behavior of those B-subjects 
concerned about payoff differences, assigning few points even if they possibly disapprove strongly that choice. This 
is not a significant problem with our technology, as the fee is very small.    
6
 The instructions for the B-players in the M-treatment and the NM-treatment are in appendix I and II, respectively. 
They have been translated to English. See also the online appendix available at http://www.uam.es/raul.lopez for the 
A-players’ instructions in both treatments. We note in this respect that the A-players’ instructions in the NM-
treatment contain a small typo, as they state in the first paragraph that A`s money payoff depends “on your decisions 
and the decisions of another participant”. The rest of the instructions clearly indicate that B cannot affect A’s 
balance, and one control question explicitly asked: “Can B ever affect your balance?” Hence, we doubt that the A-
subjects misunderstood the instructions (in fact, no subject claimed so). In any case, note that the typo could not 
affect the B-subjects’ behavior, which is the focus of this study.  
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“reward” in the instructions. Before proceeding with their decisions, participants had to fill out 
control questions to make sure that they understood the rules. 
In each treatment, subjects played the same four games in the same role and with the 
same anonymous co-player. We presented all four games on the same decision sheet and subjects 
were allowed to make their decisions in the order they wanted and revisit their choices at any 
moment before we collected their decision sheets. To prevent repeated game effects and changes 
of mood which would severely complicate the data analysis (e.g., the mood of a B-player could 
change depending on the A-player’s choice in a preceding game), no subject was informed of her 
counterpart’s actual choice in any game. Therefore, we employed the strategy method to elicit 
the decisions of the B-players, i.e., they indicated in each allocation of each game whether they 
wanted to pay the five points fee, and if this was the case, we asked them which score s between 
-100 and 100 they wanted to assign to their co-player.
7
 In addition, we elicited the A-players’ 
expectations of punishment and reward in both treatments –see López-Pérez and Kiss (2012) for 
an analysis of expectations and their accuracy; the B-players did not know about this elicitation 
so that it could not affect their behavior.
8
 
After subjects made their decisions in the four games, they answered a brief 
questionnaire. Then we collected their decision sheets and only thereafter selected one game 
randomly for payment in order to prevent income effects. These and the previous features of the 
experiment were common knowledge. Subjects were paid privately, and earned on average 18.3 
Euros in the M-treatment and 20.6 Euros in the NM-treatment. All A-players were informed at 
the time of payment about the score sent by his/her co-player B (if any) at the payoff relevant 
allocation. Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes. 
 To finish, note that our selection of games renders possible to explore several factors that 
might explain potential treatment differences. Taking into account the related experimental 
literature (see for instance Zizzo, 2003; Falk et al., 2005; Dawes et al., 2007; and Falk at el, 
                                                 
7
 A further advantage of the strategy method is that it maximizes the amount of statistical data gathered. In principle, 
this method might induce different behavior than the specific response method where participants know the choice 
made by the co-player. Falk et al. (2005) investigate this issue with respect to monetary punishment and find no 
differences in subjects’ punishment patterns, although the strength of punishment seems to be somewhat lower 
overall with the strategy method. In addition, Brandts and Charness (2011) review the experimental studies that use 
both methods and find no treatment differences in most of them. Moreover, they find that differences are particularly 
unlikely in experiments in which players make numerous choices (as in ours).  
8
 The online appendix includes the first two pages of the A-players’ decision sheet in the M-treatment, detailing how 
expectations were elicited in game 1 (the procedure was identical in the other games and the other treatment). 
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2008), we conjectured that both (a) the existence of payoff differences and (b) being 
harmed/helped were important to understand monetary punishment and reward. Observe in this 
regard that inequity aversion models (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) 
predict punishment of the A-player in treatment M if she has a larger payoff than the B-player, 
and reward if she has a smaller payoff; whereas reciprocity models (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger, 2004) predict punishment if the B-player was harmed by the A-player’s choice 
(i.e., in our games if A chooses the allocation where B’s payoff is smallest), and reward if she 
was helped.
9
 Table 2 summarizes the predictions for inequity aversion and reciprocity in each 
allocation of the four games in the M-treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The factors affecting non-monetary punishment and rewards are much less clear. It is 
possible that they are used differently than their monetary counterparts. One reason is that some 
individuals might punish/reward only if that conveniently alters the distribution of pecuniary 
payoffs between themselves and other individuals, or if it can be used to retaliate. For instance, a 
purely inequity-averse agent (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) would 
punish/reward only if that helps to reduce the payoff distance with other players. As non-
                                                 
9
 Given the small cost of punishment/reward, these predictions hold for a very large range of the models’ 
parameters. Yet the models predict no punishment and reward if the respective parameters are sufficiently close to 
zero (i.e., as the standard model of selfish types). A proof of these statements can be requested from the authors. 
TABLE 2―PREDICTIONS OF MONETARY PUNISHMENT/REWARD 
Game (A, B) allocation Predictions Left Predictions Right 
 
Left  Right Punishment Reward Punishment Reward 
1 (250, 100) vs. (200, 150) IA, RP ---- IA RP 
2 (250, 100) vs. (250, 250) IA, RP ---- ---- RP 
3 (100, 200) vs. (150, 150) ---- IA, RP RP ---- 
4 (100, 200) vs. (100, 300) RP IA ---- IA, RP 
The following notation is used: IA = Inequity aversion, RP = Reciprocity. 
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monetary punishment and rewards cannot affect others’ monetary payoffs, this kind of 
individuals would spend no money or effort to punish or reward in a non-monetary manner. 
Yet another possibility is that the main forces behind approval/disapproval are akin to 
those behind monetary rewards/punishment. A force akin to inequity aversion means that 
individuals disapprove choices that leave them disadvantaged with respect to the co-player, and 
approve those in which they get a larger payoff than the co-player. Further, a force akin to 
reciprocity implies that individuals approve choices that help them, and disapprove those that 
harm them (see Holländer, 1990, for a formalization of this idea).
10
 Since we have allocations 
where either none, one or both forces predict punishment and reward (see Table 2), our choice of 
games allows us to compare the corresponding frequencies of punishment and reward across 
games and treatments, and hence ascertain which (if any) of these forces play a role in each 
treatment. In addition, games 2 and 3 also include a strictly equal payoff allocation to investigate 
a potential role of strict equality in determining punishment and rewards.   
3. Results 
 This section is divided into four parts. First, we present the overall pattern of punishment 
and rewards in both treatments, and investigate and compare the frequency of punishment and 
rewards in each allocation of the four games. Second, we analyze whether our data is consistent 
with some hypotheses regarding motivational differences across treatments. Third, we study the 
determinants of the intensity of punishment and rewards in both treatments. Finally, we briefly 
describe the A-players’ behavior. 
3.1 Punishment and Rewarding: Overall Patterns and the Frequency of Punishment 
and Reward in each Allocation 
Figure 1 shows for both treatments the distribution of choices by the B-players in the four 
games (this means a total of 368 choices in M and 336 in NM). We observe in both treatments 
the same three spikes at s = -100, s = +100, and s = 0 (i.e., B did not pay the five points fee). 
                                                 
10
 Note well that we talk of forces ‘akin’ to reciprocity/inequity-aversion. Pure models of inequity-aversion and 
reciprocity posit that players’ utility depends on the distribution of monetary payoffs (or on beliefs about such 
distributions) and hence cannot account by themselves for approval and disapproval, two behaviors which have no 
effect on monetary payoffs (leaving aside the fact that B-players must pay 5 points to approve or disapprove, which 
is immaterial in this respect). In what follows, however, we use the terms “reciprocity” and “inequity-aversion” in a 
flexible manner to refer not only to the theories that apply to monetary punishment/reward, but also to their 
analogues for disapproval/approval. 
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Further, the distributions are similar and only marginally statistically different (two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = 0.093). The average scores and frequencies to pay the fee are also 
similar and only marginally significantly different (s = 2.6 in M and s = 8.3 points in NM, Mann-
Whitney test, z = 1.17, p = 0.24; 49% in M vs. 42% in NM, chi-squared = 3.19, p = 0.074). 
 
Nevertheless, we observe that subjects make significantly more frequent use of 
punishment than disapprovals. 27.7 percent of the decisions in M are to punish the other player 
(s < 0) compared to only 21.1 percent in NM (two-sided Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.044). 
Moreover, the average punishment is stronger than the average disapproval. For all choices s < 0, 
the average score is -85.8 points in M compared to -78 points in NM (Mann-Whitney Test, z = 
2.30, p = 0.021). Note also that 19.0 percent of the choices in M correspond to maximal 
punishment (s = -100) compared to only 10.1 percent in NM. In contrast, we do not find that 
subjects make significantly more use of rewards than approvals. The frequencies of monetary 
rewards and approval (s > 0) are very similar in M and NM (29.9 versus 29.8 percent, 
respectively; Fisher’s exact test, p = 1). Further, the average monetary reward is s = 88, which is 
similar to the average approval (s = 83.8, z = 1.26, p = 0.206). Note also that the maximal reward 
(s = +100) occurs in 20.9 percent of the cases in M and in 18.8 percent of the cases in NM.  
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Result 1: Overall, individuals use monetary punishment more frequently and stronger than 
disapproval. There are no such differences between monetary rewards and approval. 
We now take a closer look at differences and similarities for each allocation of each 
game. We first consider punishment. Table 3 shows for each allocation in both treatments, (a) the 
frequency of B-players who invested five points to punish (i.e., to assign a score s < 0), and (b) 
the average score among those players who punished. In game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150), for 
instance, we observe that 45.7 percent of the B-players in M punish at the left-hand allocation 
(250/100), and that the average punishment is s = -99.5. The corresponding numbers for the 
same allocation in NM are 38.1 percent and s = -78.8.  
 
TABLE 3―OVERVIEW OF PUNISHMENT: Frequency and strength 
 
  monetary punishment non-monetary punishment 
Game 
(A, B) allocation % Average % Average % average % Average 
Left   Right Left Left Right Right Left Left Right Right 
1 (250,100) vs. (200,150) 45.7 99.5 37 68.2 38.1 78.8 14.3 58.3 
2 (250,100) vs. (250,250) 56.5 93.5 17.4 77.5 52.4 82.7 2.4 60 
3 (100,200) vs. (150,150) 15.2 87.1 15.2 75.1 16.7 65.7 2.4 100 
4 (100,200) vs. (100,300) 28.3 80 6.5 80 35.7 83.3 7.1 80 
Note: ‘%’ refers to the percentage of subjects who punished/disapproved at the corresponding allocation. ‘Average’ refers to the mean 
punishment/disapproval by those subjects who punished/disapproved. 
   
Figure 2 uses the data from Table 3 to illustrate differences in frequencies between the 
two treatments and across allocations. The dark bars show the frequency of punishment in each 
allocation in M ‒ the allocations are ordered from the left-hand allocation in game 1, referred in 
the x-axis as L1, to the right-hand allocation in game 4, referred as R4; intermediate allocations 
are analogously denoted. In turn, each grey bar shows the frequency of disapproval in NM in the 
corresponding allocations. For later discussion, the figure also indicates the allocations at which 
inequity aversion (IA) and reciprocity (RP) predict punishment, taking into account the 
predictions included in Table 2 above.  
We observe at first sight treatment differences in three allocations: R1, R2, and R3. The 
differences between the frequencies of monetary and non-monetary punishment in these 
allocations are significant in game 1 (two-sided Fisher’s exact tests, p = 0.03), and 2 (p = 0.03), 
and marginally significant in game 3 (p = 0.06). In all these allocations, monetary punishment is 
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more frequent than non-monetary punishment. In contrast, the frequencies of punishment in the 
other five allocations are not significantly different between treatments (p > 0.49). 
 
 
With respect to monetary and non-monetary rewards, Table 4 presents for each allocation 
of each game in both treatments, (a) the percentage of B-players who invested five points to 
reward (i.e., to assign a score s > 0), and (b) average reward among those players who rewarded. 
In game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150), for instance, we observe that 13 percent of the B-players in M 
reward at the left-hand allocation (250/100), and that the average reward is of s = 83.3. The 
corresponding numbers for the same allocation in NM are 4.8 percent and s = 75. 
 
TABLE 4―OVERVIEW OF REWARD: Frequency and strength 
 
  monetary reward non-monetary reward 
Game 
 
Allocation % Average % Average % average % Average 
Left   Right Left Left Right Right Left Left Right Right 
1 (250,100) vs. (200,150) 13 83.3 28.3 81.5 4.8 75 28.6 73.3 
2 (250,100) vs. (250,250) 10.9 70 28.3 92.3 4.8 75 47.6 90.5 
3 (100,200) vs. (150,150) 52.2 90 15.2 95.7 38.1 80.6 42.9 84.4 
4 (100,200) vs. (100,300) 28.3 82.3 63 92.1 20.1 78.8 52.4 86.8 
Note: ‘%’ refers to the percentage of subjects that rewarded/approved at the corresponding allocation. ‘Average’ refers to the mean 
reward/approval by those subjects who rewarded/approved. 
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    Figure 3 is the analogue of Figure 2 for monetary rewards and approval. The dark bars 
show the frequency of monetary rewards in each allocation of M and are ordered from L1 to 
R4, as in Figure 2. The grey bars show the frequency of approval in the same allocations in 
NM. For later discussion, the figure also indicates the allocations at which inequity aversion 
(IA) and reciprocity (RP) predict rewards. 
 
 
The right-hand allocations of games 2 and 3 are the only allocations in which we observe 
differences in the frequency of rewarding at the ten percent significance level (game 2: p < 0.08; 
game 3: p < 0.01). In these allocations, approval is more frequent than monetary reward. In the 
other six allocations there are no significant differences (p > 0.2). 
Result 2: Monetary punishment is used significantly more frequently than disapproval in 3 out of 
8 allocations. Monetary rewards are used significantly less often than approval in 2 allocations. 
There are no significant differences in these two respects in the remaining allocations.  
3.2 Motivational Differences across Treatments 
 In this section we discuss potential explanations for results 1 and 2. Our conjecture is that 
they are partly due to the existence of motivational differences across treatments, and the next 
two results will present evidence in this line. The first refers to punishment.  
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Result 3: Disadvantageous payoff differences (inequity aversion) and the existence of harm 
(reciprocity) affect the frequency of monetary punishment. The existence of harm (reciprocity) 
mainly affects the frequency of disapproval. 
Evidence: If inequity aversion and reciprocity were the main forces behind monetary 
punishment, the frequency of punishment in M should be highest in allocations L1 and L2, 
where both forces predict it; reach an intermediate level in allocations R1, R3, L4, where only 
one force predicts it; and a lower level in the remaining allocations, where none of these forces 
predict punishment (see Table 2). Except for allocation R3, Figure 2 is in line with this predicted 
ranking of frequencies. Indeed, players are more likely to punish in L1 and L2 than in R3 and L4 
(p < 0.046, Wilcoxon signed-rank test) and punishment is marginally more likely in L2 than in 
R1 (p = 0.083, Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Moreover, players are also more likely to punish in 
R1 and L4 than in R4 and L3 (p < 0.034, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).  
If a force akin to reciprocity was the main one behind disapproval, in turn, the frequency 
of disapproval in NM should be highest in those allocations in which player B is harmed (L1, L2, 
R3 and L4), and lowest in the remaining allocations (R1, R2, R4, and L3). Again, the evidence 
from Figure 2 is consistent with these predictions except for R3. Disapproval in L1, L2, and L4 
is always significantly more likely than in R1, R2, R4, and L3 (p < 0.023). Note also that the 
relatively low frequency of disapproval in allocation R1, where a force akin to inequity aversion 
predicts disapproval alone, suggests that this force is relatively unimportant in NM. This finding 
might in turn partially explain why disapproval is overall less frequent than monetary 
punishment (Result 1), which seems additionally affected by payoff comparisons. 
 The previous ranking predictions are only contradicted by the data from allocation R3. 
This is particularly true in NM, where only 2.4 percent of the B-players decide to disapprove at 
R3 (as predicted by reciprocity). In our view, this data suggests that strict payoff equality reduces 
disapproval in NM (and possibly also punishment in M). We conclude that both harm and strict 
payoff equality are crucial to explain disapproval. In this line, Table 3 shows that the frequency 
of disapproval is clearly above average (larger than 35 percent) if and only if the B-player is 
harmed and strict payoff equality is not achieved (i.e. in allocations L1, L2, and L4). In contrast, 
disapproval is significantly smaller in the remaining allocations, where B is not harmed and/or 
strict equality is achieved. For example, players are more likely to disapprove in L4 as compared 
to L3 although the allocations are identical (p = 0.021, Wilcoxon signed-rank test).  
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 Our next result refers to rewards. 
Result 4: Advantageous payoff differences (inequity aversion) and the existence of help 
(reciprocity) affect the frequency of monetary rewards. The existence of help (reciprocity) mainly 
affects the frequency of approval. 
Evidence: Figure 3 shows that the frequency of reward in M is highest if it is predicted by both 
inequity aversion and reciprocity (allocations L3 and R4), reaches an intermediate level in those 
allocations in which it is predicted by one of the two (R1, R2, L4), and a lower level in the 
remaining allocations (L1, L2, R3). The differences are significant between L3 and R4 as 
compared to R1, R2, and L4 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.0045) and between R1, R2, and 
L4 as compared to L1, L2, and R3 (p < 0.058). With respect to the NM-treatment, a force akin to 
reciprocity predicts that the frequency of approval should be highest in those allocations in which 
player B is helped (R1, R2, L3, R4), and lowest in the remaining allocations (L1, L2, R3, L4). In 
this line, we observe significantly higher approval in R1, R2, L3, and R4 than in L1 and L2 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.0016) and L4 (p < 0.021; with the exception of R1 which is 
only p = 0.248). The only “outlier” is R3 in which approval is more likely than in R1 (p = 0.034).  
  We argued before that strict payoff equality reduces disapproval. The evidence from 
game 3 (100/200 vs. 150/150) suggests in turn that it also fosters approval, as 42.9 percent of the 
subjects approve R3 (even if they have been harmed). This suggests that both help and strict 
equality are important to explain approval. In this vein, Table 4 shows that a choice is approved 
above the average (and by more than 35 percent of the subjects) only if (i) it helps the B-player 
and/or (ii) it achieves strict payoff equality (R2, L3, R3, R4). In contrast, approval is very low (< 
5%) only in some allocations like L1 and L2, where conditions (i) and (ii) are not satisfied.  
 We stress that the observed role of strict payoff equality cannot be explained by a force 
akin to inequity aversion, as this force predicts approval (disapproval) only if the co-player is 
poorer (richer). In this respect, while Results 3 and 4 already indicate that payoff differences play 
a comparatively less important role than reciprocity in NM, further data also points in that 
direction. For instance, when reciprocity predicts approval and inequity aversion the opposite (or 
vice versa), we observe that the frequency of approval is much higher than that of disapproval 
(see allocations R1 and L4). In the next section, we offer further evidence for the prevalent role 
of reciprocity (compared to inequity aversion) in NM. 
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 To finish, other motivations apart from inequity aversion, reciprocity, and strict payoff 
equality might also play a role in M and hence create further differences across treatments 
(helping also to explain our previous results). In particular, efficiency concerns or altruism 
(Levine, 1998; Andreoni and Miller, 2002) may be important for monetary rewards, and spite or 
the joy of destruction (Kirchsteiger, 1994; Mui, 1995; Levine, 1998; Fehr et al, 2008; Abbink 
and Sadrieh, 2009) for monetary punishment. Altruism possibly explains why the frequency of 
monetary rewards is never lower than 13% in all allocations (this is not the case in NM; see 
Table 4). Spite may also help understanding some treatment differences. For example, it is 
conceivable that subjects in M punish more frequently the right-hand allocations of games 2 
(250/100 vs. 250/250) and 3 (100/200 vs. 150/150) than subjects in NM because of spite. In this 
vein, we observe that 10.8 percent of the subjects in M punish in at least five allocations (and 
never reward), while there are no such spiteful subjects in NM. In addition, it is possible that 
some choices in games 2 and 4 are a reaction to inefficient/efficient choices made by the A-
player. 
3.3 The Determinants of the Strength of Punishment and Reward 
Table 5 complements Tables 3 and 4, presenting the average strength at each allocation 
(i.e., the average score s; note that we set s = 0 when a B-player does not pay the 5 points fee). In 
game 1, for instance, we observe that the average strength at the left-hand allocation (250, 100) 
is s = -34.56 in M, and s = -26.43 in NM. The table also reports the results from two-sided 
Mann-Whitney tests comparing the average score at each allocation in both treatments. We find 
significant differences in the right-hand allocations of games 2 and 3. In these two cases, subjects 
in the NM-treatment choose on average a higher score s. 
 
TABLE 5―AVERAGE SCORE AT EACH ALLOCATION 
 
 Game 1 Game 2 Game 3 Game 4 
(A, B) allocation (250,100) (200,150) (250,100) (250,250) (100,200) (150,150) (100,200) (100,300) 
M-Treatment -34.56 -2.17 -45.22 12.61 33.69 3.04 0.65 52.83 
NM-Treatment -26.43 12.62 -39.76 41.67 19.76 33.81 -14.76 39.76 
P-value (Mann-
Whitney) 
0.51 0.22 0.66 0.017 0.3 0.005 0.26 0.29 
 
Note: P-values come from two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. Differences significant at the 10 percent level are in italics. 
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 To further study the determinants of the strength of monetary and non-monetary 
punishment and reward, we use a regression approach in which the dependent variable is the 
score s chosen by each individual at each allocation. As independent variables, models (1) and 
(4) in Table 6 use the variables paydiff and harm-help. Paydiff defines the difference xB - xA 
between B’s payoff and A’s payoff in the corresponding allocation. For example, the value of 
paydiff is -50 in the right-hand allocation of game 1 (250/100 vs. 200/150), and +100 in the left-
hand allocation of game 3 (100/200 vs. 150/150). Harm-help defines the difference between B’s 
payoff in the corresponding allocation and B’s payoff in the alternative allocation of the game –
in what follows, we talk about harm if this variable takes a negative value and about help 
otherwise. For instance, harm-help takes value -150 in the left-hand allocation of game 2 
(250/100 vs. 250/250), while it equals 100 in the right-hand allocation of game 4 (100/200 vs. 
100/300): by choosing this allocation, A “helps” B in 100 units. 
Harm-help is interesting because some models of reciprocity indicate that the strength of 
monetary punishment (reward) in our games depends on the size of the harm (help) inflicted.
11
 In 
turn, we include paydiff because models of inequity aversion like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
predict that the strength of monetary punishment (reward) depends on the size of the 
disadvantageous (advantageous) payoff distance. While both types of models only refer to 
monetary punishment/reward, we also study the relevance of these two variables in explaining 
the strength of approval and disapproval in order to make comparisons across treatments. 
Model (1) considers decisions in M. We observe that paydiff is highly significant (p < 
0.001). The estimated coefficient tells us that for each point difference, players decide to reduce 
the difference by 0.196 points. Similarly, harm-help is also highly significant (p = 0.004). For 
each point difference in harm/help, players decide to decrease/increase s by 0.116 points. The 
coefficient for harm-help is somewhat but not statistically smaller than the coefficient for paydiff 
(F = 2.45, p = 0.124). 
Model (4) is the correlate of model (1) for NM. We observe that paydiff is significant at 
the 5% level (p = 0.031). The estimated coefficient shows that for each point of negative/positive 
difference, players decide to increase the disapproval/approval represented by the score s in 0.08 
                                                 
11
 In Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004, p. 278), this is true at least if players are heterogeneous with respect to 
their reciprocity parameter Y and if there is a strictly positive fraction of players for any possible value of Y.  
  18 
points, which is not even half the size of the corresponding coefficient in model (1). In turn, 
harm-help is highly significant (p < 0.001). Interestingly, the estimated coefficient for harm-help 
is almost double the size as compared to model (1) and more than twice the size than the 
coefficient for paydiff: For each point difference in harm-help, players decide to 
decrease/increase s by 0.207 points. Indeed, the coefficient for harm-help in model (4) is 
significantly larger than the coefficient for paydiff in the same model (F = 4.43, p = 0.042). 
TABLE 6―PUNISHMENT & REWARD DEPENDING ON TREATMENT AND 
MOTIVATION: OLS regression analysis 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Treatment M M M NM NM NM 
Sample all s s ≤ 0 s ≥ 0 all s s ≤ 0 s ≥ 0 
Paydiff 
0.196*** 
(0.032)   
0.080** 
(0.036)   
Harm-help 
0.116*** 
(0.038)   
0.207*** 
(0.039)   
Harm 
 
0.056 
(0.046)   
0.192*** 
(0.056)  
Help 
  
0.098** 
(0.048)   
0.161*** 
(0.038) 
Envy 
 
0.207*** 
(0.049)   
0.064 
(0.049)  
Aheadness aversion 
  
0.171*** 
(0.039)   
0.066 
(0.040) 
Constant 
 
1.384 
(6.375) 
-19.841*** 
(5.826) 
21.321*** 
(6.122) 
7.836* 
(3.893) 
-9.568** 
(3.830) 
19.723*** 
(4.641) 
R-squared 0.190 0.125 0.107 0.184 0.125 0.064 
N 368 258 266 336 236 265 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors clustered on individual level in parentheses. 
Variables are defined in manuscript. 
Models (2) and (5) respectively focus on punishment and disapproval and restrict the 
sample to s ≤ 0. Models 3 and 6, in contrast, focus on reward and approval, and the sample is 
restricted to s ≥ 0. Consequently, the variables harm-help and paydiff are in these models broken 
in two parts each. The variable harm (help) defines the difference between B’s payoff in the 
corresponding and alternative allocations of the game, provided that this difference is negative 
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(positive) ‒ otherwise it takes value zero. The variable envy defines the difference xB - xA 
between B’s payoff and A’s payoff in the corresponding allocation but equals zero if xB - xA  ≥ 0. 
The variable aheadness aversion is defined as envy, except that it equals zero if xB - xA  ≤ 0. 
We observe that harm, help, envy, and aheadness aversion play different roles in M and 
NM. In particular, we observe that the two parts of inequity aversion, envy and aheadness 
aversion, significantly predict punishment and reward (p < 0.001 for both) but neither 
disapproval (p = 0.196) nor approval (p = 0.106). In contrast, the two parts of reciprocity, harm 
and help, significantly predict disapproval and approval (p < 0.002 for both) whereas harm does 
not significantly predict punishment. Help predicts reward, however (p = 0.047). We can 
summarize our evidence with regard to the strength of punishment/reward as follows: 
 
Result 5: The strength of monetary punishment and reward seems to be mainly driven by 
inequity aversion whereas the strength of disapproval and approval seems to be mainly driven by 
reciprocity considerations. 
3.4 Behavior of the A-players  
Although the main focus of our study is to compare the patterns of punishment/reward 
from the B-players in both treatments, we briefly comment here on the behavior of the A-
players. Their choices in treatments M and NM can be seen in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. 
 
TABLE 7―A-players’ Choices (M) 
Game Allocation Percentage 
  Left   Right Left Right 
1 (250,100)  vs.  (200,150)  60.9% 39.1% 
2 (250,100)  vs. (250,250) 10.9% 89.1% 
3 (100,200)  vs. (150,150) 30.4% 69.6% 
4 (100,200)  vs. (100,300) 26.1% 73.9% 
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TABLE 8―A-players’ Choices (NM) 
Game Allocation Percentage 
  Left   Right Left Right 
1 (250,100)  vs.  (200,150)  78.6% 21.4% 
2 (250,100)  vs. (250,250) 9.5% 90.5% 
3 (100,200)  vs. (150,150) 4.8% 95.2% 
4 (100,200)  vs. (100,300) 23.8% 76.2% 
Comparing choices across treatments, we observe no significant differences in games 2 
and 4. In game 1, the A-types are marginally more likely to choose allocation 200/150 in M than 
in NM (z = 1.788; p = 0.074), while in game 3 they are significantly more likely to choose 
allocation 150/150 in NM than in M (z = 3.101; p = 0.002). In games 1 and 3 of NM, in other 
words, the A-players are more likely to choose their payoff-maximizing allocation. One might be 
tempted to conclude from this that the A-players cared relatively less about approval/disapproval 
than about their monetary counterparts. This is possibly the case in game 1. The evidence is not 
so clear for game 3, however, because here any choice is highly approved in NM (see Table 4). 
Provided that the A-players anticipate this pattern, they might choose the payoff-maximizing 
allocation in game 3 more often in NM even if they care a lot about approval. In addition, the A-
types might choose less frequently that allocation in M simply because they expect some 
monetary reward if they choose the other allocation. We finally note in this respect that López-
Pérez and Kiss (2012) have analyzed in detail whether A-players in our games have accurate 
expectations. They report that average expectations are very often not significantly different than 
actual averages; interestingly, biases in expectations mostly occur in allocations where rewards 
are prevalent. In relation to our study, therefore, these results suggest that A-players anticipate 
reasonably well the motives behind punishment, but no so well the motives behind reward, or 
maybe the strength of these motives. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper compares the patterns of monetary and non-monetary punishment as well as 
rewards. These comparisons are important because both forms of punishment and reward 
constitute important mechanisms to understand human cooperation and compliance with social 
norms. We find that monetary and non-monetary punishment and rewards share some 
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similarities but also that there are several significant differences. Our analysis suggests that the 
likely explanation for the differences is twofold. First, a force akin to inequity aversion plays a 
relatively minor role for disapproval and approval compared to monetary punishment and 
rewards. Second, a force akin to reciprocity plays a relatively more important role in explaining 
approval and disapproval. In addition, we observe as well that strict payoff equality fosters 
approval and reduces disapproval.  
Our study is a first attempt to systematically compare monetary punishment and rewards 
to their non-monetary counterparts and may encourage more research on this topic. For example, 
it would be interesting to study whether monetary and non-monetary rewards and sanctions are 
differentially affected when the cost of punishing/rewarding increases. One may speculate that 
approval and disapproval are more sensitive in this respect. Another question appears when both 
types of punishment/rewards are available: When will people use the monetary or the non-
monetary version (or both)? It might also be interesting to study if people care less about 
disapproval if they believe that their behavior was justified.
12
  
Finally, our findings are also important for the development of theories of other-regarding 
preferences. In this respect, we believe that both experimental and theoretical work should go 
hand in hand, exploring questions like: Why do individuals sometimes change their behavior 
when they can be approved or disapproved? Why does strict payoff equality play such an 
important role in affecting approval and disapproval? 
                                                 
12
 Elster (1999, p. 161) provides an example in this respect: “A general who is blamed by his compatriots for a 
defeat he suffered through no fault of his own might feel bitter, resentful, indignant –but not ashamed. The 
disapproval of others might be neutralized by one’s own knowledge that there is nothing to disapprove of.” 
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Appendix I: Instructions for Participant B (Monetary Treatment) 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you will 
be paid some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
another participant. During the experiment we always speak of points; note that 
10 points = 1 Euro 
Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow 
this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If 
you have questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you. 
There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same 
number of participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random 
manner the same number of instructions for each type across the room. Given your seat choice, 
you are a type B participant. Further, you will be anonymously matched with a type A 
participant (in what follows, we call him/her A). You will never know the type of any other 
participant, nor will any other participant get to know your type. The decisions in this experiment 
are anonymous, that is, no participant will ever know which participant made which choice. 
 
Description of the Experiment 
 
  
You, as player B, and A will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-stage 
structure. In the first stage of each scenario, A has to decide between two allocations of points 
for A and you. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 150 points 
to A and 150 points to you. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to A and 60 points to you.  
 
 
 
Remember: 10 points = 1 Euro.  
 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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In the second stage of each scenario, you can affect the balance of A. For this, you must 
pay previously 5 points. If you pay the 5 points, you can then assign to A any amount of points 
between -100 and +100. This amount will decrease or increase the balance of A by the same 
amount. If you choose not to pay the 5 points, you cannot assign any points to A so that the 
allocation chosen by A is implemented. 
 
Example 1: Suppose that A chooses the left-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that you decide then to spend the 5 points and assign +60 points to A. Then A 
would have a balance of 150 + 60 = 210, and you would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.  
 
Example 2: Suppose that A chooses the right-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that you decide then to spend the 5 points and assign -30 points to A. Then A would 
have a balance of 390-30 = 360, and you would have 60-5 = 55 points. 
 
Important: When deciding, you will not know the allocation actually chosen by A in any 
scenario. For this reason, you will indicate your decision for any possible choice by A at any 
scenario. Following with the example of the figure, you should answer four questions: (1) Would 
you pay the 5 points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, what amount 
of points (between -100 and +100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the same questions if 
A had chosen (390, 60). 
 
After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a brief 
questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be chosen 
randomly (with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be paid only for 
her/his final point score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 10). To finish, 
note that you will be paid in private and that we will inform you in that moment about A’s choice 
in the payment-relevant game (without, of course, revealing A’s identity). 
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Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. 
Raise your hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct. 
In the hypothetical example of the figure, assume the following: (a) B decides to pay the 
5 points if A had chosen allocation (A: 150, B: 150), and assigns then +100 points to A, (b) B 
decides not to pay the 5 points if A had chosen allocation (A: 390, B: 60). 
 
 
 
 
 
Taking into account all this, answer the following questions,  
 What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? _______ 
 What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? ___________ 
 What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ________ 
 What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ____________ 
 
In addition: 
 
 Will you know any of the decisions taken by A before you have made your decision in all 
four scenarios?  Yes          No 
 Will A know any of your decisions before she/he has made her/his decision in all four 
scenarios?  Yes          No 
 How many scenarios has this experiment? __________ How many scenarios will be 
relevant for your payment? __________ 
 Can you ever affect the balance of A without spending 5 points?     Yes       No 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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Appendix II: Instructions for Participant B (Non-Monetary Treatment) 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you will 
be paid some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
another participant. During the experiment we always speak of points; note that 
10 points = 1 Euro 
Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow 
this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If 
you have questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you. 
 
There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same 
number of participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random 
manner the same number of instruction sheets for each type across the room. Given your seat 
choice, you are a type B participant. Further, you will be anonymously matched with a type 
A participant (in what follows, we call him/her A). You will never know the type of any other 
participant, nor will any other participant get to know that you are a type B participant. The 
decisions in this experiment are anonymous, that is, no participant will ever know which 
participant made which choice. 
 
Description of the Experiment 
 
  
You, as player B, and A will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-stage 
structure. In the first stage of each scenario, A has to decide between two allocations of points 
for A and you. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 150 points 
to A and 150 points to you. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to A and 60 points to you.  
 
 
 
Remember: 10 points = 1 Euro.  
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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In the second stage of each scenario, you cannot affect the balance of A, but you can 
approve or disapprove her/his prior choice. For this, you must pay 5 points. If you pay the 5 
points, you can then assign an evaluation score between -100 and +100 to A. A negative score 
indicates that you disapprove A’s choice (-100 is maximum disapproval), while a positive score 
indicates that you approve A’s choice (+100 is maximum approval). We note again that, 
whatever its sign, this score will not affect A’s balance. If you choose not to pay the 5 points, 
you cannot assign a score to A. 
 
Example 1: Suppose that A chooses the left-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that you then decide to spend the 5 points and assign an evaluation score of +60 to 
A. That means that you approve A’s choice with intensity equal to 60 out of 100. Note also that 
A’s balance is unchanged (A gets 150 points), whereas you would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.  
 
Example 2: Suppose that A chooses the right-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that you then decide to spend the 5 points and assign an evaluation score of -30 to 
A. That means that you disapprove A’s choice with intensity equal to 30 out of 100. Note also 
that A’s balance is unchanged (A gets 390 points), whereas you would get 60 – 5 = 55 points. 
 
Important: When deciding, you will not know the allocation actually chosen by A in any 
scenario. For this reason, you will indicate your decision for any possible choice by A at any 
scenario. Following with the example of the figure, you should answer four questions: (1) Would 
you pay the 5 points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, what 
evaluation score (between -100 and +100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the same 
questions if A had chosen (390, 60). 
After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a brief 
questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be chosen 
randomly (with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be paid only for 
her/his final point score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 10). To finish, 
note that everyone will be paid in private and that we will inform A in that moment about the 
evaluation score that you possibly assigned him/her in the payment-relevant game (without, of 
course, revealing your identity). 
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Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. 
Raise your hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct. 
In the hypothetical example of the figure, suppose that A chooses allocation (A: 150, B: 150) and 
that B decides to pay the 5 points, and assigns then an evaluation score +100 to A. In this case: 
 What would be A’s final balance? _______ 
 Does B approve or disapprove A’s choice? ___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppose now that A chooses allocation (A: 390, B: 60) and that B decides not to pay the 5 
points. 
 What would be A’s final balance then? ________ 
 What would be B’s final balance then? ____________ 
 
In addition: 
 Will you know any of the decisions taken by A before you have made your decision in all 
four scenarios?  Yes          No 
 Will A know any of your decisions before she/he has made her/his decision in all four 
scenarios?  Yes          No 
 How many scenarios has this experiment? __________ How many scenarios will be 
relevant for your payment? __________ 
 Can you ever affect the balance of A?     Yes       No 
 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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Web appendix **Not to be published** 
Instructions for Participant A (Monetary Treatment) 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you will 
be paid some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
another participant. During the experiment we always speak of points; note that 
10 points = 1 Euro 
Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow 
this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If 
you have questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you. 
There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same 
number of participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random 
manner the same number of instructions for each type across the room. Given your seat choice, 
you are a type A participant. Further, you will be anonymously matched with a type B 
participant (in what follows, we call him/her B). You will never know the type of any other 
participant, nor will any other participant get to know your type. The decisions in this experiment 
are anonymous. This means no participant will ever know which participant made which choice. 
Description of the Experiment 
 
  
You, as player A, and B will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-stage 
structure. In the first stage of each scenario, you have to decide between two allocations of points 
for you and B. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 150 points 
to you and 150 points to B. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to you and 60 points to B.  
 
 
 
Remember: 10 points = 1 Euro.  
 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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In the second stage of each scenario, B can affect your balance. For this, B must pay 
previously 5 points. If B pays the 5 points, B can then assign to you any amount of points 
between -100 and +100. This amount will decrease or increase your balance by the same amount. 
If B chooses not to pay the 5 points, she cannot assign any points to you so that the allocation 
chosen by you is implemented. 
 
Example 1: Suppose that you choose the left-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assigns to you +60 points. Then you 
would have a balance of 150 + 60 = 210, and B would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.  
Example 2: Suppose that you choose the right-hand allocation in the previously 
illustrated scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assigns to you -30 points. 
Then you would have a balance of 390-30 = 360, and B would have 60-5 = 55 points.  
  
Important: When deciding, B will not know the allocation actually chosen by you in any 
scenario. For this reason, B will indicate her decision for any possible choice by you at any 
scenario. Following with the example of the figure, B should answer four questions: (1) Would 
you pay the 5 points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, what amount 
of points (between -100 and +100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the same questions if 
A had chosen (390, 60). 
After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a brief 
questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be chosen 
randomly (with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be paid only for 
her/his final point score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 10). To finish, 
note that you will be paid in private and that we will inform you in that moment about B’s choice 
in the payment-relevant game (without, of course, revealing B’s identity). 
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Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. 
Raise your hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct. 
In the hypothetical example of the figure, assume the following: (a) B decides to pay the 5 points 
if A had chosen allocation (A: 150, B: 150), and assigns then +100 points to A, (b) B decides not 
to pay the 5 points if A had chosen allocation (A: 390, B: 60). 
  
 
 
 
 
Taking into account all this, answer the following questions,  
 What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? _______ 
 What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 150, B: 150)? ___________ 
 What would be the final point score of A if she/he chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ________ 
 What would be the final point score of B if A chooses (A: 390, B: 60)? ____________ 
 
In addition: 
 Will you know any of the decisions taken by B before you have made your decision in all 
four scenarios?  Yes          No 
 Will B know any of your effective decisions before B has made her/his decision in all 
four scenarios?  Yes          No 
 How many scenarios has this experiment? __________ 
 How many scenarios will be relevant for your payment? __________ 
 Can B ever affect your balance without spending 5 points?     Yes       No  
 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
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Decisions of a type-A participant 
 
The 4 scenarios 
 
 
For your information, we present here the point allocations available in each of the 4 scenarios. 
In the next sheets, you can take your decisions in each scenario. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In the next sheets, you can take your decisions in any order as you wish (that is, you do not 
need to start deciding in scenario 1). Until we collect your decision form, moreover, you can 
always change your decision in any scenario if you decide so (to facilitate this, you can initially 
use a pencil; write down your final decision with a pen, though). 
 
 
A: 250 
B: 100 
A: 200 
B: 150 
 A 
A: 250 
B: 100 
A: 250 
B: 250 
 A 
Scenario 2 
A: 100 
B: 200 
A: 150 
B: 150 
 A 
Scenario 3 
A: 100 
B: 200 
A: 100 
B: 300 
 A 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 1 
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Scenario 1 
                                             
 
                        Recall: 10 points = 1 Euro 
 
 
 
The point allocation that I choose in this scenario is (select it with a circle):  
  
 A: 250, B: 100 
 
 A: 200, B: 150 
 
Independently of your previous choice, we kindly ask you to make a series of estimations 
(your answers here will not affect your final payoff): 
 
 
 
 What is the percentage of participants B that will pay the 5 points if A chooses (250, 
100)? ________  (this must be a number between 0 and 100, both included) 
 
 
 
 In the previous case, how many points (in average) will these B-participants assign to the 
A-participant? ________   (this must be a number between -100 and 100, both included) 
 
 What is the percentage of participants B that will pay the 5 points if A chooses (200, 
150)? ________  (this must be a number between 0 and 100, both included) 
 
 In the previous case, how many points (in average) will these B-participants assign to the 
A-participant? ________   (this must be a number between -100 and 100, both included) 
 
 
A: 250 
B: 100 
A: 200 
B: 150 
 A 
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Instructions for Participant A (Non-Monetary Treatment) 
Welcome to this experiment on decision making. At the end of the experiment, you will 
be paid some money; the precise amount will depend on your decisions and the decisions of 
another participant. During the experiment we always speak of points; note that 
10 points = 1 Euro 
Please, do not talk to any other participant during the experiment. If you do not follow 
this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and you will not earn any money. If 
you have questions, please raise your hand and we will attend you. 
There are two types of participants in this experiment: A and B. There is the same 
number of participants of each type. Previously, the instructor has distributed in a random 
manner the same number of instructions for each type across the room. Given your seat choice, 
you are a type A participant. Further, you will be anonymously matched with a type B 
participant (in what follows, we call him/her B). You will never know the type of any other 
participant, nor will any other participant get to know your type. The decisions in this experiment 
are anonymous, that is, no participant will ever know which participant made which choice. 
 
Description of the Experiment 
 
  
You, as player A, and B will take decisions in four scenarios, all of them with a two-stage 
structure. In the first stage of each scenario, you have to decide between two allocations of points 
for you and B. In the hypothetical example of the figure, the left-hand allocation gives 150 points 
to you and 150 points to B. The right-hand allocation gives 390 points to you and 60 points to B.  
 
 
 
Remember: 10 points = 1 Euro.  
 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
  37 
In the second stage of each scenario, B cannot affect your balance, but can approve or 
disapprove your prior choice. For this, B must pay 5 points. If B pays the 5 points, B can then 
assign an evaluation score between -100 and +100 to you. A negative score indicates that B 
disapproves your choice (-100 is maximum disapproval), while a positive score indicates that B 
approves your choice (+100 is maximum approval). We note again that, whatever its sign, this 
score will not affect your balance. If B chooses not to pay the 5 points, B cannot assign a score to 
you 
 
Example 1: Suppose that you choose the left-hand allocation in the previously illustrated 
scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assign a score of +60 to you. That 
means that B approve your choice with intensity equal to 60 out of 100. Note also that your 
balance is unchanged (you get 150 points), whereas B would get 150 – 5 = 145 points.  
Example 2: Suppose that you choose the right-hand allocation in the previously 
illustrated scenario and that B then decides to spend the 5 points and assign a score of -30 to you. 
That means that B disapproves your choice with intensity equal to 30 out of 100. Note also that 
your balance is unchanged (you get 390 points), whereas B would get 60 – 5 = 55 points. 
  
Important: When deciding, B will not know the allocation actually chosen by you in any 
scenario. For this reason, B will indicate her decision for any possible choice by you at any 
scenario. Following with the example of the figure, B should answer four questions: (1) Would 
you pay the 5 points if A had chosen (150, 150)?, (2) in case you pay the 5 points, what score 
(between -100 and +100) would you assign then to A?, (3) and (4) the same questions if A had 
chosen (390, 60). 
After all participants have taken their decisions in the four scenarios and answered a brief 
questionnaire, the instructor will collect your form. Afterwards, one scenario will be chosen 
randomly (with the roll of a die). This is important because any participant will be paid only for 
her/his final point score in that scenario (the instructor will divide that score by 10). To finish, 
note that everyone will be paid in private and that we will inform you in that moment about the 
evaluation score that B assigned to you in the payment-relevant game (without, of course, 
revealing B’s identity). 
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Before we proceed with the experiment, please answer the following control questions. 
Raise your hand after that so that we can verify that the answers are correct. 
In the hypothetical example of the figure, suppose that A chooses allocation (A: 150, B: 150) and 
that B decides to pay the 5 points, and assigns then a score +100 to A. In this case: 
 What would be A’s final balance? _______ 
 Does B approve or disapprove A’s choice? ___________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppose now that A chooses allocation (A: 390, B: 60) and that B decides not to pay the 5 
points. 
 What would be A’s final balance then? ________ 
 What would be B’s final balance then? ____________ 
In addition: 
 Will you know any of the decisions taken by B before you have made your decision in all 
four scenarios?  Yes          No 
 Will B know any of your decisions before she/he has made her/his decision in all four 
scenarios?  Yes          No 
 How many scenarios has this experiment? __________ How many scenarios will be 
relevant for your payment? __________ 
 Can B ever affect your balance?     Yes       No 
A: 150 
B: 150 
A: 390 
B: 60 
 A 
